We reviewed laboratory-acquired infections occurring in Utah from 1978 
Medical laboratories pose some unusual occupational hazards including infections. Many of these infections are serious, and some have resulted in death. Epidemiological analysis of these infections may identify environmental and personal risk factors and lead to appropriate control measures.
A British survey of infections in 21,000 laboratorians (including medical, technical, scientific, and clerical staffs) during 1971 detected acquired cases of tuberculosis, shigellosis, brucellosis, and hepatitis (8) . The annual incidence of infection in England and Wales calculated was 4.3 per 1,000 laboratorians. Pike's review of reported worldwide laboratory-acquired infections over 76 years showed decreasing numbers (14) . During the years 1968 to 1977, there were 550 infections compared with 650 during the preceding 10 years, possibly reflecting technological advancements, disposable materials, and increased safety requirements.
We conducted a survey of all clinical laboratory supervisors in Utah to characterize laboratory-acquired infections.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A written survey and a telephone interview were conducted. Survey forms were sent to supervisors of all 84 Utah clinical diagnostic laboratories. These were the laboratories that perform tests on any body fluid of patients, whether or not the laboratories were located within the hospital. The survey form requested the number of microbiologists, microscopists, hematologists, pulmonary blood gas technicians, blood bank technicians, generalists, and phlebotomists employed. Pathologists Tuberculosis. Tuberculosis purified protein derivative skin test conversion occurred in a generalist and in a microbiologist, both of whom cultured specimens for Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Both used safety hoods. The exact routes of transmission were classified as unknown because the infections could not be associated with any particular culture. The annual incidence in Utah for laboratorians is 0.3 per 1,000.
Cellulitis. Two cases of cellulitis occurred. The first occurred after a phlebotomist was cut by a broken tube. The second, in a generalist, involved three episodes of cellulitis eventually discovered to be self-inflicted. The Staphylococcus aureus isolated from the lesions had an identical sensitivity pattern to a multiply resistant control strain used for laboratory studies.
Conjunctivitis. One case of conjunctivitis occurred. While a microbiologist was inoculating an eye swab on primary Table 1) . Microbiologists were at greatest risk of acquiring infection with an annual incidence of 9.4 per 1,000 followed by generalists (5.2 per 1,000) and phlebotomists (3.1 per 1,000) ( Table 2) . Shigellosis was acquired only by microbiologists and accounts for more than half of their infections. Hepatitis infection, however, was not associated with any particular laboratory specialty.
Of the 18 cases of laboratory-acquired infections we identified, the routes of transmission were unknown in 10, parenteral inoculation in 1, working with, the culture in 4, laboratory accident in 2, and self-inflicted in 1 case (Table 3) . None was known to be associated with aerosol production. (14) . In 1973, an unusual outbreak was described (13 (15) . He also noted 44 cases of S. typhi in Japan when a disturbed bacteriologist inoculated food.
Conjunctivitis. A case of laboratory-acquired gonococcal conjunctivitis occurred when a tuberculin syringe and needle separated, spraying the technician's face and eye (3) . A similar accident reported in 1976 resulted in a case of laboratory-acquired syphilis (7) . These accidents led to the recommendation to use syringes with self-locking needle devices. The conjunctivitis case we report, however, was associated with the use of a specimen swab to inoculate media.
Sources of infection. The sources of infection can be difficult to categorize. Broad general categories have been utilized. Sometimes the source of the infection is obscure. Working with the culture was utilized as a category when it was known only that the victim worked directly with the infectious agent.
Recognized accidents accounted for one-fifth of the total acquired infections reported by Pike and included those from needle and syringe, sprays, spills, injury from broken objects, pipette aspiration, bites, and scratches (14, 15) .
Syringes and needles continue to be prime offenders; therefore, we distinguished them from other laboratory accidents. A recent survey that included laboratory personnel showed that one-third (35%) of them were injured during the year past, and only one-fourth (8%) of those injured reported the injury and sought treatment (9) . Although most of the injuries involved blood contamination, the reason given most frequently for not reporting was an assumption that the injury was unimportant.
In clinical and diagnostic laboratories, another major source of infection is aerosol production associated with procedures. Pike's study indicated that aerosol was responsible for 13% of the 3,900 cases he analyzed.
Aerosols are particles produced that are 5 ,um or less in size. These can penetrate into intraalveolar spaces, but larger aerosols or droplets present a hazard of infection by direct contact. (14) . She became ill 4 days later and died.
Three cases of Pseudomonas pseudomallei infection have been recently reported in laboratory workers (16) . Review of two of the cases suggested exposure through aerosol. The third case involved a bacteriologist who accidentally spilled the organism during centrifugation. That accident involved larger aerosol and droplet contamination. Bench top and instrument surface contamination with droplets are associated with all procedures (9) .
Compensation. Several supervisors mentioned compensation for acquired infections to be a problem. Worker's Compensation laws were passed to provide compensation to workers injured in their work and to provide security to their dependents without the need to resort to personal injury litigation (12) . Most cases involving employees' acquisition of an infectious disease come under these laws. In the past, occupational diseases were handled separately. In interpreting these two categories of law, sometimes the court has looked for an accident to put the injury or disease under Worker's Compensation laws. Even infections have been designated as accidents. Infections present unusual problems legally because they can be acquired outside employment. To qualify for Worker's Compensation, there must be a causal relationship between the disease and the employment. This is often established in terms of whether the risk of an employee's contracting the disease in a particular job is greater than the risk to the general population. (12) .
Communication between the personnel of the laboratory and the infection control program can affect whether claims concerning laboratory-acquired infections are awarded compensation. Infection control programs should include documentation of whether patients had certain infectious diseases and their location within the hospital. Disease occurring in laboratorians should be reported and recorded. Also, employee health determinations such as skin tests, serum antibody levels, and immunization and infection history may be helpful in determining whether an infection was related to employment.
Conclusion. From Pike's worldwide data, it appears that laboratory-acquired infections may be decreasing. They clearly remain, however, a special occupational hazard for laboratorians. Our calculated incidence of infection is almost certainly an underestimate because of subclinical infections and poor recall.
The difference in rates reported by small and large hospitals is intriguing. Large hospitals may be safer, or it may be more difficult for their supervisors to recall infections occurring among a larger number of employees.
To prevent hepatitis B infection, the use of hepatitis B vaccine in laboratorians should be strongly considered. The high risk of shigella infection in microbiologists suggests that gloves and meticulous handwashing should be used when handling pure shigella cultures. The problem of infection acquired from proficiency testing samples has been recognized by Blaser et al. (1, 2) and in our survey and should be addressed by those circulating and handling these specimens.
With over one-half of these infections, the route of transmission was unknown. Assuming that an accident or needlestick would be recalled, many of these may be associated with working with the specimen or possibly aerosol or large droplet inoculation (or both). Meticulous attention to maintaining a clean work site is important. All accidents and injuries should be evaluated, treated, and documented as soon as possible.
Frequent handwashing remains the most important tool in infection control in the laboratory, as it is on the hospital wards.
